

## Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, KS, KN, CHI  
SUBJECT: THIRTIETH UNGA-CHRONOLOGY OF CHINA'S APPROACHES  
ON KOREA

1. MUCH HAS BEEN COMMENTED AND WRITTEN ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AT THE 30TH GA AND POSSIBILITY THAT CHINA MIGHT HAVE BEEN WILLING TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION. THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY MAKES CLEAR THAT , WHILE THE CHINESE DELEGATION DANGLED TO SEVERAL DELEGATIONS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE IDEA OF SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE OR TRADE ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE ON THE TWO KOREAN RESOLUTIONS, THEY PULLED BACK EACH TIME WHEN PROBED. WHEN PRESSED TO THE POINT OF HAVING TO DECLARE THEMSELVES, THE CHINESE EACH TIME WERE SPECIFIC IN SAYING THAT THE END RESULT OF WHATEVER FORMULA MIGHT BE DEvised WOULD HAVE TO INCORPORATE FORMAL ACCEPTATNCE BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF BOTH KOREAN RESOLUTIONS. WE MUSH CONCLUDE THEREFORE, ON THE BASIS OF ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK, THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT A SUITABLE COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE CHINESE.

2. THE CHINESE POSITION MIGHT BE DUE TO ONE OF SEVERAL FACTORS:  
A. INABILITY OF THE CHINESE TO BRING THE NORTH KOREANS ALGERIANS AND OTHERS ALONG TO A COMPROMISE

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FORMULA. IT WILL BE RECALLED THE CHINESE HAD SERIOUS AND EMBARRASSING PROBLEMS WITH THEIR ALLIES ON THE ISSUE IN

1973 WHEN WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN DEVISING A COMPROMISE FORMULA.

B. CHINESE COMPETITION WITH SOVIETS FOR THE FAVOR OF THE NORTH KOREANS, NEITHER ONE BEING WILLING TO BE SEEN AS THE LESSER FRIEND OF KIM IL SUNG. THIS CONSIDERATION WOULD TEND TO INHIBIT THE CHINESE FROM ASSUMING A POSITION WHICH WOULD EXPOSE THEM TO CHARGES OF HAVING WORKED FOR A COMPROMISE.

C. LACK OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE IN WORKING OUT A COMPROMISE WITH THE UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THE ALGERIAN RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREA HAD AMPLE VOTES FOR PASSAGE IN PLENARY.

3. CHOICE OF ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE REASONS AS THE BASIS FOR THE CHINESE POSITION WOULD BE MERE SPECULATION.

4. CHRONOLOGY OF CONTACTS WITH CHINESE ON KOREA AT 30TH GA:

A. OCTOBER 30--CHINESE COUNSELOR CHOU NAN SUGGESTED TO USUN MISOFF THAT UNGA PLENARY COULD POSTPONE FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF KOREAN QUESTION UNTIL 31ST UNGA BY MERELY ACCEPTING COMMITTEE ONE REPORT ON ITEM (USUN 5500).

B. OCTOBER 31 --AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN RAISED THIS APPROACH WITH CHINESE PERMREP HUAN HUA. HUANG HUA CONFIRMED CHINA'S INTEREST (USUN 5532).

C. NOVEMBER 1--DEPARTMENT CABLED AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN TO PIN DOWN HUAN HUA ON THIS PROCEDURE. DEPARTMENT SAID IT COULD AGREE WITH DEFERRING CONSIDERATION OF KOREA TO 31ST UNGA OR WITH MERELY ADOPTING COMMITTEE ONE REPORT IN PLENARY. (STATE 259547).

D. NOVEMBER 3--USUN REPORTED SIMILAR OCTOBER 30 APPROACH BY CHINESE TO BELGIANS (USUN 5573).

E. ABOUT NOVEMBER 4--OUR NEW ZEALAND CO-SPONSOR REPORTED THAT SINGAPORE PERMREP KOH HAS ASKED KUANG HUA ABOUT HIS REPORTED INTEREST IN POSSIBILITY THAT UNGA PLENARY MIGHT SIMPLY ACCEPT THE COMMITTEE ONE REPORT WITHOUT VOTING ON THE TWO KOREAN RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY COMMITTEE ONE. HUANG HUA CONFIRMED TO KOH THAT CHINA WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT

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ACCEPTANCE OF COMMITTEE REPORT AS PLENARY ACTION; BUT AT SAME TIME, HUANG HUA MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT FORMAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE UNGA OF THE TWO RESOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE ACTION (USUN 5669).

F. NOVEMBER 11-MOYNIHAN SPOKE TO HUANG HUA ABOUT STATUS OF CHINESE SUGGESTION. HUANG HUA REPLIED THAT, SINCE HIS SUGGESTION HAD NOT GOTTEN ALGERIAN SUPPORT, IT HAD BEEN PUT ASIDE (USUN 5902 AND 5882).

G. NOVEMBER 17--BEFORE NOVEMBER 18 CONSIDERATION OF KOREAN QUESTION BY PLENARY, AMBASSADOR BENNETT MADE

ONE MORE TRY WITH CHOU NAN ON THE IDEA THAT PLENARY MIGHT MERELY ADOPT COMMITTEE REPORT AS A WHOLE WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE BEING MADE TO EITHER OF THE COMPETING RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED BY COMMITTEE ONE. CHOU NAN AFFECTED SURPRISE THAT THERE WOULD AT ANY TIME HAVE BEEN THE THOUGHT THAT CHINA WOULD BE PREPARED FOR AN OUTCOME THAT DID NOT INCLUDE FORMAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION THEY HAD SYPPORTED ON KOREA. SUCH A CONCLUSION, STRESSED CHOU NAN, WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING OF CHINA'S "PRINCIPLED POSITION."

5. COMMENT: THE KOREAN WORKING GROUP (U.S. AND ALLIES) WAS UNANIMOUS IN ITS VIEW THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSITION IN NO WAY OFFERED A POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING ACTION ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS ON KOREA. THE CHINESE SEEMED TO BE PRESENTING A PROPOSITION WHCIH, IF ACCEPTED BY OUR SIDE, COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS ON OUR PART: THEY HAD EVERYTHING TO GAIN AND NOTHING TO LOSE IF BOTH RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. ADOPTION BY CONSENSUS WOULD HAVE REFLECTED ACCEPTANCE BY OUR SIDE OF THE CONTENT OF THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION.  
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